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25X6 WESTERN EUROPE - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Varied Spanish Reaction to Portuguese Events

Independent Spanish commentators and moderate politicians are saying that the left-ward drift in Portuguese politics can no longer be stopped and that this should be a lesson to Spain to organize democratic forces before it is too late.

The three leading independent Spanish newspapers are using the Portuguese experience to demonstrate why Spain should lose no time in organizing non-extremist political forces in anticipation of Franco's demise. According to the Catholic-oriented Ya, the chaotic situation arising from the problems of succession to Caetano in Portugal is a result of the absence of organized political forces other than those which "operated clandestinely," i.e., the Communists. An editorial in Informaciones points to the need for Spaniards to meditare on the Portuguese events and to take advantage of time "to organize democratic political life in which the sovereign people and its decisions are not exposed to the will of extremism on right or left which are only capable of governing with the help of force."

in Madrid reports that the prevailing sentiment among forward looking Franco loyalists as well as the opposition, is that there is no time to lose in organizing forces in the center and to the right of center. These moderates fear, however, that the far right will continue to view all change as dangerous and argue for more severe crackdowns on dissenters. Thus moderates fear that the far right will close ranks in such a way as to prevent political development capable of coping with the post-Franco situation. (Confidential)

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Resumption of Talks May Be Delayed

The resumption of the intercommunal negotiations on a Cyprus settlement may be delayed following disagreement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots over the Venue and the composition of the delegations.

The Greek Cypriots prefer to hold the talks in New York where they believe it will be easier for UN Secretary General Waldheim to play a substantial role. Turkish Cypriots have opposed any major role for Waldheim and are also reported to fear that talks in New York would be subjected to partisan, pro-Greek pressures. A Turkish Cypriot radio broadcast today noted that Turkish Cypriot officials would agree to hold the negotiations in any European capital.

The intention to replace Rau. Denktash as the Turkish Cypriot negotiator will further complicate efforts to get the talks started. This move is apparently designed to support Denktash's contention that as President of the newly proclaimed "Federated Turkish State of Cyprus" he is an equal to President Makarios and can no longer negotiate with Glafkos Clerides who holds a lower official position. Vedat Celik, who presented the Turkish Cypriot case at the recent Security Council debate on Cyprus, will be the new negotiator for the Turkish Cypriot community, according to a Turkish Cypriot radio broadcast.

The replacement of Clerides and Denktash with individuals of lesser stature would deal a serious setback to the talks and increase the likelihood that Athens and Ankara will become more directly involved.

Secretary General Waldheim was scheduled to begin contacts with the two sides in New York today in an effort to get the talks resumed. (Secret)

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Italian Communists Convene National Congress

The Italian Communist Party opens its national congress tomorrow in a confident mood, but still faces serious proplems in its pursuit of a direct voice in the national government. The main aims of the congress will be to unify the party behind a strategy to overcome these obstacles and to launch the Communist campaign for crucial local elections expected to take place in June.

The Communists have made substantial progress in recent years toward securing greater public acceptance of the party--one which is qualified to take a place eventually in the national government.

Despite the party's strong position, however, there is evidence of division in Communist ranks over party chief Berlinguer's strategy of seeking membership in a coalition with the Christian Democrats.

At the leadership level, the disagreements seem confined to the timing and modalities of Berlinguer's strategy. Some party leaders would prefer to speed up the process and make fewer demands on the Christian Democrats, but Berlinguer and the group around him--who will remain in charge after the congress--see the "historic compromise" as a long-term objective that depends on major changes in Christian Democratic policies and leadership.

25X1X dissension is even more acute among the rank and file who have trouble grasping the subtleties of Berlinguer's line. Many members fear that the party is sacrificing its revolutionary aims, and they wonder how the national leaders can aim at a modus vivendi with the Christian Democrats while

blaming all of Italy's ills on them. Party officials have tried to dispel these doubts, but the congress will doubtless devote considerable time to clearing up the remaining confusion.

Another troublesome topic will be the Communists' strained relations with the Socialist Party. The Communists had hoped to emerge from the congress with a plan for coordinating leftist activity in Italy, but the Socialists are refusing to follow the Communist lead. The Socialists instead are criticizing the Communists' governmental ambitions and stressing their own demand for a larger role in the center-left coalition.

Finally, the Communists will try again to convince skeptics that they are not subservient to the Soviets. As differences have gradually narrowed between the Communists and the governing parties in fields such as economic policy, the Communists' tie with Moscow has increasingly been seen as an obstacle to their broader participation in any Italian government. Thus, the Communists will undoubtedly point out that they no longer insist on Italian withdrawal from NATO as a condition for their entry into the government, (Secret No Foreign Dissem)